

**A. INTRODUCTION**

The 2012 *City Environmental Quality Review (CEQR) Technical Manual* defines community facilities as public or publicly funded facilities, including schools, health care, day care, libraries, and fire and police protection services. Direct effects may occur when a proposed project physically alters or displaces a community facility. Indirect effects may result from increases in population that place additional demands on community facility service delivery.

The proposed project would not introduce any residents to the project sites, and therefore would not warrant analyses of public schools, child care, health care, or library facilities. In addition, because the proposed project would not directly cause the displacement of a police or fire facility, nor would it introduce a sizeable new neighborhood, no detailed assessment of such services is required. However, this chapter will provide a screening-level analysis of police and fire protection facilities.

**PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS**

Overall, the proposed project would not result in significant adverse impacts on community facilities as the project would not result in a direct effect on any community facility, nor would it contain a residential component that would place additional demands on the service delivery of any community facility. As described below, it is not expected that the proposed project would adversely affect emergency access and response time.

**B. POLICE AND FIRE PROTECTION SERVICES**






According to the *CEQR Technical Manual*, the ability of the New York City Police Department (NYPD) and New York City Fire Departments (FDNY) to provide public safety for a new project typically does not warrant a detailed assessment under CEQR. The *CEQR Technical Manual* recommends detailed analyses of impacts on police and fire service in cases where a proposed project would affect the physical operations of, or direct access to and from, a precinct house or fire station, or where a proposed project would create a sizeable new neighborhood where none existed before. The proposed project would not result in direct effects on either police or fire services, nor would it create a sizeable new neighborhood. As noted in the *CEQR Technical Manual*, FDNY does not allocate resources based on proposed or projected development, but regularly evaluates the need for changes in personnel, equipment, or locations of fire stations and makes any adjustments necessary. Furthermore, NYPD independently reviews its staffing levels by focusing on a precinct's population, area coverage, crime levels, and other local factors. Therefore, the proposed project would not result in any significant adverse impacts to police and fire protection services, and a detailed analysis is not warranted.


The existing police and fire facilities serving the project sites are described below and are shown in **Figure 4-1**.



UPPER NEW YORK BAY



-  Project Sites
-  Study Area Boundary (1 1/2-Mile Perimeter)
-  120th Police Precinct Boundary
-  Police Station
-  Fire Facility



## **POLICE SERVICES**

The project sites are located within the Staten Island's Police Department's 120th Precinct. The 120th Precinct's precinct house is located at 78 Richmond Terrace across from the Richmond County Bank Ballpark. The 120th Precinct services Staten Island's residential communities located between Richmond Terrace and Interstate 278 and covers an area of about 13.5 square miles.

## **FIRE PROTECTION SERVICES**

FDNY engine companies perform fire suppression efforts at structural fires citywide while ladder companies provide search, rescue, and building ventilation functions. Rescue and squad companies specifically respond to fires or emergencies in support of the other units and perform specialized tasks or functions as necessary. In addition, FDNY operates the City's EMS system.

Two FDNY facilities are located within 1½ miles of the project sites. Engine 155 Ladder 78 is located approximately ¾ of a mile southwest of the project sites at 14 Brighton Avenue. Engine 153 Ladder 77 is located approximately 1¼ miles south of the project sites at 74 Broad Street.

Units responding to a fire are not limited to the ones closest to it. Normally, a total of three engine companies and two ladder companies respond to each call. Each FDNY squad company is capable of operating as an engine, ladder, or technical rescue company, making them versatile for incident commanders. Each squad is also part of the FDNY HazMat Response Group and has HazMat Tech Unit capabilities. FDNY can call on units in other parts of the City as needed, as it has 198 engine companies and 143 ladder companies citywide.

As detailed in Chapter 14, "Transportation," 13 traffic impacts were identified during the weekday MD and Saturday MD peak hours, 14 traffic impacts were identified during the Weekday PM peak hour, and 15 traffic impacts were identified during the Saturday PM peak hour. Chapter 22 of the DEIS describes measures that would mitigate the significant adverse impacts. All of the significant adverse impacts identified in Chapter 14 would be fully mitigated with the exception of the impacts at the Richmond Terrace and Staten Island Ferry Viaduct (cars) and Staten Island Ferry Viaduct (buses) intersections and the Richmond Terrace and Hamilton Avenue intersection.

Although the significant adverse impacts at the above three intersections would remain unmitigated, FDNY response times are not expected to be significantly affected by the projected increases in traffic generated by the proposed project. Access to and from the study area's fire stations would not be directly affected by the proposed project. Furthermore, within Staten Island, from 2008 to 2012, the average FDNY response time to structural fires decreased by 16 seconds to 4 minutes and 29 seconds.<sup>1</sup> The average citywide FDNY response time to structural fires decreased by 21 seconds to 4 minutes and 1 second from 2008 to 2012.<sup>2</sup> From 2008 to 2012, medical response times also improved. The citywide response time to life-threatening medical emergencies by fire units has improved by 8 seconds to an average of 4 minutes and 11 seconds and the citywide response time to life-threatening medical emergencies by ambulance units has improved by 14 seconds to an average of 6 minutes and 25 seconds.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Mayor's Management Report, September 2012, FDNY, p. 10.

<sup>2</sup> Mayor's Management Report, September 2012, FDNY, p. 10.

<sup>3</sup> Mayor's Management Report, September 2012, FDNY, p. 10.

FDNY and emergency service vehicles can maneuver around and through congested areas because they are not bound by standard traffic controls. As described above, response times have decreased citywide, and are expected to decrease further despite the increasingly congested traffic conditions in many areas of the city. Service to surrounding areas would continue to be provided by FDNY facilities that have a broad geographic distribution. Therefore, incremental traffic volumes projected to occur with the proposed project are not expected to significantly affect FDNY response times.

In the future with the proposed project, FDNY would evaluate the need for personnel and equipment and make necessary adjustments to adequately serve the area. All development would be constructed in accordance with applicable fire and safety codes.

Existing access along Bank Street adjacent to the Stadium would be maintained. With the proposed project, Bank Street would be widened from a 24-foot roadway to a 30-foot roadway from Jersey Street to the easternmost boundary of the North Site. Along the South Site closest to the Ferry Terminal, vehicular access for emergency response and equipment would be provided via three options: a dedicated roadway immediately adjacent to the waterfront for NYCDOT and emergency vehicle use; loading access lanes that travel through the project garage; and a mountable pedestrian plaza. These improvements bifurcate pedestrians and waterfront activities to minimize hazards. They also give emergency vehicles multiple access routes.

#### *SAFETY AT THE OBSERVATION WHEEL*

The proposed Observation Wheel is designed with extensive life safety and emergency provisions. An N+1 emergency generator system, which is also called parallel redundancy and is a safeguard to ensure that an uninterruptible power system is always available, would be provided to operate the Wheel in the event of a general power failure. The emergency generator system would be located outside of current or modified flood zones. At all times, there would be two security cameras to monitor activity in each capsule. In addition, each capsule would have an intercom that would allow instant communication with the operating staff in the control room which would be monitoring all activity on the Wheel. In the event of an emergency, evacuation procedures have been developed to ensure safety of all visitors on the Wheel. Emergency measures include on-site personnel who would be trained to evacuate the Wheel as well as an on-site paramedic during all hours of operation. Each capsule would have fire and smoke detection sensors. If smoke is detected in a capsule, an alarm would be transmitted to the control room. In extreme circumstances, any capsule could be returned to the boarding platform in approximately seven minutes. FDNY would automatically be notified in the event of a fire.

All evacuation and rescue modes would be part of the Wheel's design and documentation and would include Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for single capsule evacuation and total wheel evacuation where the Wheel could be rotated. In the highly unlikely event of the Wheel not being able to be turned under normal or emergency power, there would also be evacuation systems built into the capsules and the Wheel itself. These procedures would also be included in the Life Safety documentation. There would also be regular staff training and exercises based on the agreed SOPs and it is expected that the local emergency services would be heavily involved in these sessions. \*